

Introduction: The standard view is that modal operators apply to propositions. Under this view, the interrogative-embedding use of responsive modal verbs like *know* is ‘reduced’ to their declarative-embedding use (e.g., Karttunen 1977, Spector & Egré 2015). For instance, *John knows who left* is analyzed as ‘For some proposition p that is an answer to the question expressed by the complement *who left*, John knows p .’ Thus, whether *know* combines with a declarative or an interrogative complement, it is always taken to apply to a proposition.

Another, more recent view is that modals always take questions, modeled as sets of propositions, as their input (Uegaki, 2015; Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2018). Under this view, both declarative and interrogative complements denote sets of propositions. In the case of a declarative complement this set only has one element (or only one *maximal* element in inquisitive semantics, where sentence denotations are downward closed). Thus, the interrogative-embedding use of a verb like *know* does not need to be reduced to its declarative-embedding use. Rather, the verb gets a single entry which applies uniformly to both types of complement.

Elliott et al. (2017) argue for the question-based view, observing that so-called verbs of relevance like *care* and *matter* cannot be given a reductive account. In particular, *John cares who left* cannot be analyzed as ‘For some answer p to *who left*, John cares that p .’ On the other hand, George (2011) and Spector and Egré (2015) (S&E) raise a concern for the question-based view, which is that it does not predict any constraints on the range of possible responsive modal operator meanings. To illustrate this point, S&E consider the fictitious verb *shknow*, which is equivalent to *know* when taking a declarative complement and equivalent to *wonder* when taking an interrogative complement. Under the reductive treatment of responsive modal operators, such verbs are predicted not to exist in any language. On the non-reductive, question-based treatment of responsive modals, such constraints are not predicted.

We offer new evidence for the question-based view coming from the Japanese modal particle *darou*, which behaves roughly like S&E’s *shknow*. Below we present the core empirical observations (building on Hara and Davis, 2013; Hara, 2015) and an outline of our theoretical account, which is fully spelled out in the paper.

Empirical observations: With a declarative prejacent, as in (1a), *darou* translates as ‘I expect’. In contrast, in the presence of the question particle *ka*, it translates as ‘I wonder’, as in (1b)-(1c).

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|-------------------------------------|------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| (1) a. Taro-wa utau- darou . | b. Taro-wa utau- darou-ka . | c. Dare-ga utau- darou-ka . |
| Taro-TOP sing-DAROU | Taro-TOP sing-DAROU-Q | who-NOM sing-DAROU-Q |
| ‘I expect Taro will sing.’ | ‘I wonder if Taro will sing.’ | ‘I wonder who will sing.’ |

Sentences like (1b)-(1c), do not behave like questions. For instance, one cannot respond to them with “Why are you asking *me* that question?”. Therefore, it is assumed that *ka* does not apply to the matrix clause in such constructions, but is part of the prejacent of *darou* (Hara and Davis 2013). This means that *darou* is a responsive modal particle that is compatible with both declarative and interrogative prejacent, just like verbal responsive modals like *know*. Importantly, however, the interrogative-embedding use of *darou* cannot be reduced to its declarative-embedding use: ‘I wonder Q ’ does not mean that for some answer p to Q , ‘I expect p ’.

What makes *darou* even more interesting is its interaction with intonation (Hara 2015). As seen in (2a), with final rising intonation, *darou* with a declarative prejacent expresses a biased question, similar to English tag-questions. On the other hand, rising intonation is incompatible with *darou-ka*, as in (2b)-(2c).

- (2) a. Taro-wa utau-**darou**↑. b. *Taro-wa utau-**darou**-ka↑. c. *Dare-ga utau-**darou**-ka↑.
‘John will sing, won’t he?’

Theoretical background: Our account is formulated in inquisitive epistemic logic (IEL) (Ciardelli and Roelofsen, 2015). In this framework, every individual a is associated, in every world w , with a doxastic state dox_a^w and an inquisitive state inQ_a^w . As usual, dox_a^w is a set of possible worlds. On the other hand, inQ_a^w is a set of doxastic states, all extensions (i.e, subsets) of dox_a^w , in which the issues that a entertains in w are resolved. It is assumed that $\text{dox}_a^w = \bigcup \text{inQ}_a^w$. Besides these basic IEL notions, we also associate every individual a in every world w with an ‘expectation state’ exp_a^w , consisting of all worlds compatible with what a expects in w .

The semantic value of a sentence φ in IEL, $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$, is a downward-closed set of propositions, namely those propositions that support the information that φ conveys (if any) and resolve the issue that φ raises (if any). The truth-conditions of φ are derivable from $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$: φ is true in w iff $\{w\} \in \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$. The informative content of φ , $\text{info}(\varphi)$, is the set of all worlds where φ is true, $\bigcup \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$. The semantics of the relevant operators in IEL is given below: E_a stands for ‘ a expects’, W_a for ‘ a wonders’, $?$ is an operator that trivializes the informative content of φ , and $!$ one that trivializes the issue that φ expresses, leaving its informative content intact.

- (3) a. $\llbracket E_a \varphi \rrbracket := \{p \mid \forall w \in p : \text{exp}_a^w \subseteq \text{info}(\varphi)\}$
b. $\llbracket W_a \varphi \rrbracket := \{p \mid \forall w \in p : \text{dox}_a^w \notin \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \text{ and } \text{inQ}_a^w \subseteq \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket\}$
c. $\llbracket ?\varphi \rrbracket := \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket \cup \llbracket \neg\varphi \rrbracket$
d. $\llbracket !\varphi \rrbracket := \{p \mid p \subseteq \text{info}(\varphi)\}$

Account: We treat *ka* and the final rise as in (4) and *darou* as in (5), where $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket$ is the at-issue content of φ , $\llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^\bullet$ its non-at-issue content, and \odot the deictic center which for our purposes here is the speaker (the deictic center can shift in embedded contexts, Hara & Davis 2013). To paraphrase: φ *darou* has the informative content of φ as its at-issue content, and contributes ‘I expect φ but wonder whether indeed φ ’ as non-at-issue content.

- (4) a. $\llbracket \varphi \text{ ka} \rrbracket = \llbracket \varphi^\uparrow \rrbracket = \llbracket ?\varphi \rrbracket$ (5) a. $\llbracket \varphi \text{ darou} \rrbracket = \llbracket !\varphi \rrbracket$
b. $\llbracket \varphi \text{ ka} \rrbracket^\bullet = \llbracket \varphi^\uparrow \rrbracket^\bullet = \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^\bullet$ b. $\llbracket \varphi \text{ darou} \rrbracket^\bullet = \llbracket E_\odot !\varphi \wedge W_\odot ?\varphi \rrbracket \cap \llbracket \varphi \rrbracket^\bullet$

We assume that in uttering a sentence φ , a speaker always commits herself to $\text{info}(\varphi)$, unless the non-at-issue meaning of φ signals that the speaker does not believe $\text{info}(\varphi)$. Further, we assume that a sentence that is marked as a question by a final rise is degraded if it is necessarily non-inquisitive (both at-issue and non-at-issue), i.e., no matter what its prejacent is, and that a sentence which is marked as an assertion by a final fall is degraded if it is necessarily non-informative (both at-issue and non-at-issue) (cf., Gajewski 2002).

Predictions: The following semantic values are derived for the crucial examples (using the fact that for any atomic sentence ψ , $!\psi \equiv \psi$, $??\psi \equiv ?\psi$, and $E_\odot !?\psi$ is tautologous.)

- (6) a. $\llbracket \psi \text{ darou} \rrbracket = \llbracket \psi \rrbracket$ (8) a. $\llbracket \psi \text{ darou}^\uparrow \rrbracket = \llbracket ?\psi \rrbracket$
b. $\llbracket \psi \text{ darou} \rrbracket^\bullet = \llbracket E_\odot \psi \wedge W_\odot ?\psi \rrbracket$ b. $\llbracket \psi \text{ darou}^\uparrow \rrbracket^\bullet = \llbracket E_\odot \psi \wedge W_\odot ?\psi \rrbracket$
(7) a. $\llbracket \psi \text{ darou-ka} \rrbracket = \llbracket !?\psi \rrbracket$ (tautologous) (9) a. $\llbracket \psi \text{ darou-ka}^\uparrow \rrbracket = \llbracket !?\psi \rrbracket$ (tautologous)
b. $\llbracket \psi \text{ darou-ka} \rrbracket^\bullet = \llbracket W_\odot ?\psi \rrbracket$ b. $\llbracket \psi \text{ darou-ka}^\uparrow \rrbracket^\bullet = \llbracket W_\odot ?\psi \rrbracket$

As seen in (6), the non-at-issue meaning of ψ *darou* conveys that the speaker expects ψ , and wonders whether ψ is indeed the case. The first conjunct captures the most salient implication of (1a), described in its translation above. The second conjunct implies that the speaker does not know whether ψ (by (3b), wondering implies lack of knowledge), which means that we correctly predict that in uttering (1a) the speaker does not commit to the at-issue informative content, $\text{info}(\psi)$. Turning now to (7), we predict that ψ *darou-ka* has trivial at-issue content but carries a non-at-issue implication that the speaker is wondering whether ψ . This matches the intuitive translation of (1b) above. In (8), we see that the at-issue meaning of ψ -*darou-ka*↑ is

that of a polar question, *whether* ψ , while its non-at-issue meaning conveys a bias toward ψ , matching the translation in (2a). Finally, we predict the degradedness of ψ -*darou-ka*[†] since, as seen in (9), both its at-issue and its non-at-issue content are necessarily non-inquisitive, even though the sentence is marked as a question by the final rise, and thus requires inquisitiveness.

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