Rising Imperatives

Deniz Rudin, UC Santa Cruz (drudin@ucsc.edu)

Motivation and scope

Formal investigations of rising declaratives (RDs, e.g. You got a haircut?) show that altering the intonation that accompanies an utterance can change the speech act it instantiates—in this case, from an information-giving to an information-requesting speech act (e.g. Gunlogson 2008, Malamud & Stephenson 2015). Several accounts explain the behavior of RDs in terms of a general discourse effect of rising intonation (Gunlogson 2001, Truckenbrodt 2006, Farkas & Roelofsen 2017, building on Pierrehumbert & Hirschberg 1990, Bartels 1999), allowing for a compositional account of the effect of rising intonation on other sentence types, including imperatives. However, the empirical behavior of rising imperatives (RIs) has not been thoroughly investigated, nor has the potential for extending the above accounts of RDs to RIs been fleshed out, with the exception of Portner (2015). In this talk, I present an empirical investigation of the behavior of RIs in English, Dutch, German, Hebrew, and French, showing the data to be problematic for Portner’s account, and develop a theoretical analysis extending a prior proposal that rising intonation calls off speaker commitment (Truckenbrodt 2006, Rudin 2017).

The empirical terrain

I focus on sentences accompanied by a steep, monotonic rise (the L* H-H% tune). Example sentences ending in question marks are to be read with that tune. RIs are generally interpreted as suggestions (cf. Portner 2015). I give an English and a Hebrew example here:

(1) a. A: I really like this gift Grandma got me. B: Write her a thank-you note?
   b. A: Ani ayef, ma laasot? B: Lech lishon kusat?
      1SG tired what to.do go.IMP to.sleep little
   A: ‘I’m tired, what should I do?’ B: ‘Take a nap?’

In each case, B seems to highlight a possible course of action relevant to A, but stop short of instructing her to take it. Support for the intuition that RIs are mere suggestions comes from their infelicity in contexts that require imperatives to be interpreted as orders:

(2) [Context: speaker is a drill sergeant at boot camp.] #Drop and give me twenty?

I make two novel empirical observations about RIs. First, sequences of mutually incompatible RIs are felicitous. The sequences of English and Dutch RIs in (3) are felicitous, but would be infelicitous with falling intonation.

(3) a. A: I have a deadline, but I’m exhausted. Do you have any advice?
   B: Work on your paper? Blow it off and go to the beach?
   b. [Context: addressee is losing her ability to concentrate on the talks at a conference]
   Doe een dutje? Ga naar huis
   do.IMP a nap go.IMP to. home
   ‘Take a nap? Go home?’

Second, RIs are not identical to ‘weak’ uses of falling imperatives, like offers. Weak uses of falling imperatives can be followed up on with I insist; this is infelicitous with RIs:

(4) a. A: Have a cookie. A: Have a cookie?
   B: No, thanks. B: No, thanks.

Problems for prior accounts

Portner (2015) builds an elaborated model of discourse contexts in which all interlocutors have models of each other’s ‘to-do lists’. He proposes that falling imperatives update the speaker’s model of the addressee’s ‘to-do lists’, whereas RIs directly update the addressee’s model of her own ‘to-do list, building on Portner’s (2004) treatment of imperatives and
Gunlogson’s (2001) treatment of rising intonation. This account does not predict the felicity asymmetry between mutually incompatible sequences of rising and falling imperatives. If a sequence of updates to a to-do list is incoherent, it is incoherent no matter whose to-do list is being updated.

**Proposal** I extend Truckenbrodt’s (2006) proposal that rising intonation calls off speaker commitment to imperatives. On this proposal, RDs highlight a potential discourse update (the one associated with a standard assertion), but don’t commit the speaker to preferring that the update go through. This proposal relies on the distinction between what update the utterance of a sentence proposes and what its utterance commits the speaker to, both of which stand in a principled relationship to its denotation (see Rudin 2017 for details). Prior accounts of imperatives have not given a formal account of that distinction. Some focus on the denotation of imperatives (e.g. Kaufmann 2012, 2016, Oikonomou 2016, von Fintel & Iatridou 2017), others on their update potential (Portner 2004, Charlow 2014, Starr 2017) or on what they commit the speaker to (Condoravdi & Lauer 2012). None provide a unified account of all three, allowing for clear predictions about how removing the commitment portion of an imperative speech act will impact its discourse behavior.

I develop a proposal that borrows from all three of the above families of accounts. I take imperatives to denote priority-modalized propositions. I take utterances of imperatives to highlight a possible future state of the discourse in which the addressee has committed to act in accordance with that modal prescription, and I take utterances of falling imperatives to commit the speaker to preferring that the discourse enter that highlighted state, i.e., to preferring that the addressee perform the highlighted task. We can call the speaker commitment enacted by utterances of falling imperatives ‘endorsement’, following Condoravdi & Lauer (2017).

I formalize the proposal within the discourse model of Farkas & Bruce (2010) as elaborated by Farkas & Roelofsen (2017). This model incorporates discourse commitments into the notion of discourse contexts. A context $K_i$ includes a set of interlocutors $A_i$ and a set of sets of discourse commitments $D_i$, containing for each $a \in A_i$ a set of propositions $DC_{a,i}$ they are publicly committed to in $K_i$. Utterances are functions from an input context $K_i$ to an output context $K_o$. Utterances also take as arguments an author $a$ and a sentence $s$. I propose that utterances also take an intonational tune $t$ as an argument. The $L^* H-H\%$ tune puts a condition on output contexts that enforces identity between the speaker’s discourse commitments pre- and post-utterance:

$$ (5) \text{ For any utterance } UTT((a, s, t, K_i)) \rightarrow K_o, \text{ if } t = L^* H-H\%, \text{ } DC_{a,o} = DC_{a,i} $$

As a result, RDs are ‘presentational’ imperatives: they highlight a potential future commitment state of the addressee, but they stop short of endorsing that the addressee enter that state.

**Accounting for the facts** The infelicity of RDs in contexts that require orders (2) follows because orders require speaker endorsement of the highlighted task. The asymmetry in (3) follows from the proposal, as it can be cooperative to highlight incompatible paths forward for the addressee to consider, but it cannot be cooperative to endorse that the addressee take them both. I analyze I *insist* as presupposing a prior speaker endorsement, explaining the asymmetry in (4).

**Ramifications** The idea that intonational tunes can alter imperative speech acts has ramifications for debates about the modal force of imperatives. Oikonomou (2016) and von Fintel & Iatridou (2017) argue that imperatives have existential, not universal, force, on the basis of data like this:

$$ (6) \text{ Go left! Go right! I don’t care. } \text{(vF&I’s ex. 7)} $$

Though felicitous if read in a particular way, (6) is infelicitous if read with steep, monotonically falling intonation. (6) may be telling us something about the contribution of the intonation necessary to render it felicitous, rather than about the semantics of imperatives. The proposal’s methodological upshot is that intonational tunes are potential confounds that must be controlled for.
References


Gunlogson, Christine. 2001. True to form: Rising and falling declaratives as questions in English: University of California, Santa Cruz dissertation.


