

- (9) a. $\exists[W_0 + \llbracket S \text{ drown} \rrbracket]$
 b. $\{\exists[W + \llbracket S \text{ drown} \rrbracket]: W \text{ is a way}, W \neq W_0\}$
- (10) a. $\exists[R_0 \times \llbracket \text{the lts went out} \rrbracket]$
 b. $\{\exists[R \times \llbracket \text{the lts went out} \rrbracket]: R \text{ is a reas.}, R \neq R_0\}$
- (11) How else has Sam impressed you?
 (12) Why else has Benedict complained?

5. Factive islands. *How* and *why* often seem to resist extraction over a factive embedding verb like *know*, e.g. (13a) and (14a) cannot ask about the way Sam drowned or the reason the lights went out.

- (13) a. How does Betty know Sam drowned?
 b. $\{K[W + \llbracket \text{Sam drowned} \rrbracket]: w \text{ is a way}\}$
- (14) a. Why does Betty know the lights went out?
 b. $\{K[R \times \llbracket \text{the lights went out} \rrbracket]: r \text{ is a reason}\}$

[1] and [8] offer competing accounts of this factive island (FI) effect. Both assume for (13a) and (14a) the question sets in (13b) and (14b), where K stands in for the semantic contribution of the embedding context (*Betty know*), and wavy underlining marks the factive presupposition that K triggers. But the two accounts differ in the strengths of their assumptions about the answer sets for FI questions. [1] needs the premise that there exist at least two propositions in the answer set with incompatible factive presuppositions; [8] requires the stronger premise that all propositions in the answer set have incompatible presuppositions. [1], focusing on HQs, suggests that only the weaker premise of [1]’s account is justified. However, by uncovering exclusivity in (1a) and (2a), the *wh else* data in (3a) and (4a) provide independent support for the stronger assumption underlying [8]’s account, suggesting that indeed all answers in FI cases like (13b) and (14b) carry incompatible factive presuppositions. If so, the relevant premises of both accounts are justified, and discriminating arguments must come from elsewhere ([11]).

6. Two kinds of reasons. Supported by intuitions about possible linguistic responses to HWQs, ways and reasons have been proposed to come in different kinds. [9] suggests that ways include manners and methods, while [12] takes reasons to include causes and grounds. These works also suggest a corresponding typology of HWQs, which differ in terms of what kinds of ways or reasons they are used to ask about. Given this, setting aside existential obviation, the obvious empirical question is whether the exclusivity uncovered above is tied to particular types of HWQs, or whether it is fully general. For HQs, we are not actually aware of clear cases where exclusivity fails to hold in the absence of obviation. However, WQs indeed appear to fall into two different groups with regard to exclusivity. Alongside examples like (4a), we also find cases like the (naturally occurring) example in (15a).

- (15) a. Why else are you angry at me?
 b. Why else could you be angry at me?

(15a) need not be interpreted as (15b), indicating that no implicit modalization is judged to be needed to obviate infelicity. Apparently, then, (4a) and (15a) contrast in acceptability in virtue of asking about different types of reasons, or reasons for different types of explananda. The conspicuous difference between (4a) and (15a) is that the former asks about the cause for a physical event (of drowning) while the latter asks about the reason for a mental state (of being angry). The natural hypothesis, then, is that causes of physical events are necessarily unique whereas causes for mental states need not be. As a beginning of a defense of this hypothesis, we suggest that the contrast between (4a) and (15a) can be replicated outside WQs, with causative predicates like *cause* or *make*. [14], who explicitly argues for the uniqueness of causes, reports that (16) (where *for the second time* is intended to exclude existential obviation) is contradictory. In contrast, we submit that there is no contradiction in (17).

- (16) Bill’s sneezing caused Betty to catch a cold for the second time, and so did something else.
 (17) Bill’s constant talking about hockey made Betty angry at him for the second time, and so did something else.

7. Conclusion. Using additive *wh else*, the logical make-up of answer sets for elusive HWQs can be probed directly. According to this diagnostic, HWQs often but not always have answer sets of mutually exclusive propositions. Exclusivity can expectedly be obviated by existential operators. More surprisingly, there appear to be two types of WQs which differ in terms of exclusivity, presumably because of the types causes and effects the refer to. We suggest that this finding should to be interpreted in relation to proposals about the nature of causation and explanation (e.g., [7], [14], [12]).

References. [1] Abrusán 2014. *Weak Island Semantics*, OUP. [2] Dayal 1996. *Locality in Wh Quantification*, Kluwer. [3] Hamblin 1973. *Questions in Montague English*, *Foundations of Language*. [4] Harris 2014. *Who else but Sarah?* In *UCLA Working Papers in Linguistics*. [5] Higginbotham 1993. *Interrogatives*. In *The View from Building 20*, MIT Press. [6] Karttunen 1977. *Syntax and semantics of questions*, L&P. [7] Lewis 1974. *Causation*, *The J of Philosophy*. [8] Oshima 2007. *On Factive Islands: pragmatic anomaly vs. pragmatic infelicity*, In *New Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence*, Springer. [9] Sæbø 2016. *How questions and the manner–method distinction*, *Synthese*. [10] Schwarz 2017. *On the locus of question exhaustification*. Talk at NELS 48. [11] Schwarz and Simonenko 2016. *Two pragmatic accounts of factive islands*. NELS 46. [12] Skow 2016. *Reasons Why*, OUP. [13] Stanley 2011. *Know How*. OUP. [14] Unger 1977. *The uniqueness in causation*. *American Philosophical Quarterly*