



- (14) a.  $\llbracket \text{some twenty} \rrbracket = \llbracket \text{some} \rrbracket(\llbracket \text{twenty} \rrbracket) = \lambda x. x \in f(\{y: |y|=20\})$   
 b.  $\llbracket \text{some twenty cars} \rrbracket = \lambda x. x \in f(\{y: |y|=20\}) \ \& \ \text{cars}(x)$
- (15)  $\llbracket (1) \rrbracket = 1$  iff  $\exists x[x \in f(\{y: |y|=20\}) \ \& \ \text{cars}(x) \ \& \ \text{involved-in-accident}(x)]$

The varying interpretations of *some+n* can then be traced to the value assigned to the function *f*. The exact interpretation arises when *f* is interpreted as a subset function (i.e.  $f(P) \subseteq P$ ); the result is truth-conditionally indistinguishable from the corresponding sentence without *some*, but has an emphatic effect, for which we provide a pragmatic analysis. The approximate reading (for speakers who have it) obtains when *f* expands the set to include pluralities of cardinality close to *n*.

The other felicitous examples (2)-(5) can be analyzed similarly to (1). In (2), *some* operates on the equivalence class of portions of matter weighing 5 ounces. In (3), the relevant set is a set of spatial vectors (Zwarts & Winter 2000), per (16); a vector-based analysis can also be applied to adjectival cases such as (5). Finally, (4) involves a set of temporal intervals *t* (Krifka 1989), per (17).

- (16)  $\exists v[v \in f(\{v': |v'|=10 \text{ ft}\}) \ \& \ \text{start}(v, \text{the house}) \ \& \ \text{end}(v, \text{the tree})]$

- (17)  $\exists e[\text{singing}(e) \ \& \ \text{Agent}(e, \text{Sue}) \ \& \ \tau(e) \in f(\{t: 45\text{-minutes}(t)\})]$ , where  $\tau$  = runtime

By contrast, expressions such as *1989* and *3 o'clock* cannot be construed as denoting sets over which *some* can operate, but instead refer directly to points or intervals on the time line; hence the infelicity of (6) and (7).

The present analysis also accounts for the infelicity of (9) and (10) with *some*: these contexts require the argument interpretation of the number word (Rothstein 2012), whereas to compose with *some*, the predicative interpretation is required.

**Extensions to ‘ordinary’ *some*:** It has been observed that *some*  $N_{\text{singular}}$  yields an ignorance effect, while *some*  $N_{\text{plural}}$  does not. *Some+n* patterns with the plural case:

- (18) a. Some student called. #It was John.  
 b. Some students called – John, Sue and Ann.  
 c. Some three students called – John, Sue and Ann.

Alonso-Ovalle & Menéndez-Benito (2011) account for a similar singular/plural asymmetry with Spanish *alguno(s)* ‘some’ by proposing that the function *f* lexicalized by the indefinite determiner satisfies an anti-singleton constraint ( $f(P)$  is a non-singleton set). In the singular case, an ignorance inference is derived via pragmatic reasoning about singleton-domain alternatives. In the plural case, there are no acceptable alternatives, so no implicature is generated. This analysis extends to singular *some* and (with some additional assumptions) its plural counterpart. It also correctly predicts the absence of ignorance effects with *some+n*. (18c) expresses the proposition (19a). Its alternatives would be of form (19b). However, each such proposition is equivalent to one of the form (19a) (which could have been the one intended by the speaker). E.g., if *f* in (19b) picks out a singleton set containing the triple of students  $j \oplus s \oplus a$ , the resulting proposition is equivalent to one of the form (19a) in which *f* picks out the non-singleton set containing  $j \oplus s \oplus a$  plus some triple(s) of non-students. As with plural *algunos*, there are thus no acceptable alternatives, so no ignorance effect arises. Thus the same mechanism that explains the distribution and interpretation of *some+n* (the function *f*) also accounts for the varying pattern of ignorance effects with *some* more generally.

- (19) a.  $\Box_w \exists x [x \in f(\llbracket \text{three} \rrbracket) \ \& \ \text{students}(x) \ \& \ \text{called}_w(x)]$ , where  $|f(\llbracket \text{three} \rrbracket)| > 1$   
 b.  $\Box_w \exists x [x \in f(\llbracket \text{three} \rrbracket) \ \& \ \text{students}(x) \ \& \ \text{called}_w(x)]$ , where  $|f(\llbracket \text{three} \rrbracket)| = 1$

The present approach to *some* also explains its non-occurrence in characterizing generics and kind reference (e.g. *(#some) dogs bark*; *(#some) dinosaurs are extinct*). These may be analyzed as involving the kind (argument) interpretation of the noun phrase (Chierchia 1998); but *some* must compose with the nominal on its predicative type. This is essentially the nominal equivalent of the degree-reference case in (9)-(10), and further demonstrates the parallel operation of *some* in the two domains.

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