

Protagonist Projection

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1. The puzzle In a four-page reply to Tsohatzidis concerning the veridicality of the verb *tell*, Holton (1997) discusses the following examples:

- (1) a. He gave her a ring studded with diamonds, but they turned out to be glass.
- b. She knew that he would never let her down, but, like all the others, he did.

He observes that the reason why these sentences do not sound contradictory (or factive, in the case of (1b)) is that they involve a type of perspectival shift that he calls *Protagonist Projection* (PP). Experimental evidence suggesting that speakers can indeed understand similar sentences under perspectival shift was given in Buckwalter (2014). Harris and Potts (2009), although not familiar with Holton’s paper, arguably tested the same phenomenon: they showed that their subjects could understand examples such as (2) as if *a possible government spy* was interpreted from the point of view of the roommate:

- (2) I am increasingly worried about my roommate. She seems to be growing paranoid. The other day, she refused to talk with the mailman, a possible government spy.

In the above examples, similarly to Free Indirect Discourse (FID), perspectival shift happens without any overt operator. Unlike in FID, however, indexical adverbs such as *yesterday*, *tomorrow* do not shift in PP, only non-indexical context-sensitive expressions do (cf. Stokke 2013):

- (3) a. [PP] A week ago, Ann was pacing around after coming home from the jeweller, disappointed and angry with John. #Yesterday/the day before he gave her a ring studded with diamonds, but they turned out to be glass. (Stokke 2013)
- b. [FID] Tomorrow was Monday, Monday, the beginning of another school week! (Lawrence, *Women in Love*, cited in Banfield 1982, p98.)

2. Stokke’s (2013) proposal tries to cash out the intuition that PP is a type of perspective shift just like FID, but it is less complete in that only a subset of the items that shift in FID shift in PP. Modeling his proposal on that of Schlenker (2004), he suggests that in PP interpretation is with respect to two contexts, just as in FID: the context of utterance (**C**) and the context of thought (**d**). However, in PP the context of thought (**d**) coincides with the context of utterance (**C**) *except* for w_d , which is shifted. Thus, according to Stokke (2013), in PP indexical items have the same meaning as in Schlenker (2004), but will all be interpreted, in effect, with respect to the context of utterance. The shift is confined to non-indexical elements.

- (4) a. $[\text{he}_i]^{M,g,C,d} = \#$ iff in w_C , $g(i)$ is not a male individual different from author_C and hearer_C . Otherwise $[\text{he}_i]^{M,g,C,d} = g(i)$.
- b. $[\text{past}_k]^{M,g,C,d} = \#$ iff $g(k)$ is not before now_C . Otherwise $[\text{past}_k]^{M,g,C,d} = g(k)$.
- c. $[\text{yesterday}]^{M,g,C,d} = \text{the day before the day of } \text{now}_d$

What leads to the difference in interpretation of indexical adverbs such as *yesterday* wrt. FID is the assumption that $t_C = t_d$. As a consequence, *yesterday* is interpreted as the day before the utterance time, which leads to it’s infelicity in the context of Holton’s (1997) original example. The world parameter w_d however does not coincide with w_C , which is why *diamonds* can be interpreted from the perspective of the protagonist.

3. A problem: Speaker-oriented items Stokke’s (2013) system runs into a difficulty when we try to interpret speaker-oriented items (expressives, evaluative adverbs) in PP:

- (5) Unfortunately she received an idiotic ring studded with glass, but it turned out to be diamond.

Both the expressive *idiotic* and the evaluative adverb *unfortunately* above can be interpreted from the perspective of the author of the context of thought. The analysis of such items thus should be able to make reference to the author of a context in which they are used. But it is unclear how this could be done under Stokke’s (2013) proposal, where the only difference between the two contexts is in the world parameter. Observe Eckardt’s (2014) interpretation of evaluative adjectives in FID:¹

- (6) $\llbracket \text{unfortunately S} \rrbracket^{M,g,<C,d>}$
 a. asserted content: $\llbracket \text{S} \rrbracket^{M,g,<C,d>}$
 b. expressive content: $\llbracket \lambda w.\text{REGRET}(\text{author}_d, \text{now}_d, w, p) \rrbracket^{M,g,<C,d>}$

Since for Stokke (2013) the author of the two contexts coincides, speaker oriented items will be interpreted, incorrectly, with respect to the author of the external context.

4. An alternative proposal I propose that the context of utterance and the context of thought do not overlap in PP, but can be entirely different, just as in FID. The difference between FID and PP comes about because indexical adverbs *yesterday*, *here*, *etc.* can be interpreted either with respect to the context of thought or with respect to the context of utterance. When they are interpreted with respect to the context of thought, this results in the more vivid description, FID. When they are interpreted with respect to the context of utterance, the resulting discourse has the properties of PP. Thus the two types of perspectival shift, FID and PP, differ not in the nature of the two contexts they relate to, but with respect to which of these contexts indexical adverbs are interpreted.

Technically, I propose to adapt Eckardt’s (2014) analysis of FID to be able to cover PP as well. As in Eckardt (2014), tenses receive a non-presuppositional analysis:² (R is for reference time and P is a variable over sets of time intervals). Indexical adverbs, however, can be interpreted with respect to **d** (which results in FID) or **C** (which results in PP).

- (7) a. $\llbracket \text{past} \rrbracket^{M,g,<C,d>} = \llbracket \lambda P. (P(R) \wedge R < \text{now}_C) \rrbracket^{M,g,<C,d>}$
 b. $\llbracket \text{yesterday} \rrbracket^{M,g,<C,d>} = \llbracket \lambda e. (\tau(e) \subset \iota t. t \text{ DAY-BEFORE}(\text{now}_C)) \rrbracket^{M,g,<C,d>}$
 or $\llbracket \lambda e. (\tau(e) \subset \iota t. t \text{ DAY-BEFORE}(\text{now}_d)) \rrbracket^{M,g,<C,d>}$

Presuppositions are accommodated in the beliefs of the author of the context of thought (**d**) in both cases of perspectival shift. This explains the non-factive interpretation of the first clause of (1b), as well as the possibility of a shifted interpretation of gender presuppositions of referential pronouns (cf. Sharvit 2008). Speaker oriented expressions (evaluative adverbs, expressives, etc.) have an expressive content that makes reference to author_d hence it will be evaluated wrt. the context of thought (**d**) in double contexts.

5. Grades of perspectival shift Natural language allows perspectival shift without overt operators. FID and PP represent two points on a continuum of such perspectival

¹I simplify Eckardt’s (2014) system for the purpose of this abstract.

²Note that the presuppositional analysis of tenses in Schlenker (2004) would force us to stipulate different possibilities for presupposition accommodation for different presuppositional items.

shift. I propose to represent this by loosening the semantic criteria on shiftable indexicals. However, I will also observe data that argue for a picture that is more complicated than that sketched above: In particular, while FID shows certain quotation-like properties (cf. Maier 2015), PP does not. Finally, I will also compare PP with a recent theory of “viewpoint shift” in Hinterwimmer (2017).

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